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 For this installment of the Recent Developments, we consider six 
recent Florida Supreme Court decisions. First, we consider Maddox 
v. State,1 where the court interpreted the phrase “any trial” in section 
316.650(9), Florida Statutes (2001), as excluding citations for forgery 
only from matters related to motor vehicles and not literally from 
“any trial,” despite the statute’s plain language.2 Next, we consider 
Bush v. Holmes,3 where the court held the state law authorizing a 
system of vouchers known as the Opportunity Scholarship Program 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 31 Fla. L. Weekly S24 (Fla. Jan. 12, 2006). 
 2. Judith Brodkin contributed this Note. 
 3. 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006). 
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(OSP) violated the Florida Constitution.4 Riggs v. State (Riggs II)5 is 
the court’s most recent treatment of the exigent circumstances excep-
tion.6 Then, we examine Florida Department of Revenue v. City of 
Gainesville,7 where the court upheld the facial constitutionality of 
statutes imposing ad valorem taxes on telecommunication services 
owned by a municipality.8 Costarell v. Florida Unemployment Ap-
peals Commission9 examines the court’s holding that state agencies 
are bound by controlling judicial statutory interpretations.10 Our fi-
nal Note takes up Wilson v. Salamon,11 where the court created a 
bright-line rule that court orders entered to resolve good faith mo-
tions should automatically be treated as activity, thus precluding 
dismissal for lack of record activity.12  
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS 
SECTION 316.650(9), FLORIDA STATUTES, TO MEAN THAT CITATIONS 
FOR FORGERY ARE ONLY EXCLUDED FROM MATTERS RELATED TO 
MOTOR VEHICLES AND NOT LITERALLY “ANY TRIAL”—Maddox v. Flor-
ida, 31 Fla. L. Weekly S24 (Fla. Jan. 12, 2006). 
 Statutory interpretation is an important tool that judges use in 
deciding cases, but unless the statute is facially ambiguous, the 
courts must yield to the plain meaning put forth by the legislature.13 
When courts start using context, legislative history, and legislative 
purpose, they head down a slippery slope, which can lead to courts 
substituting their own judgments for that of the legislature. Statu-
                                                                                                                     
 4. Katy Donlan contributed this Note. 
 5. 918 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2005). 
 6. Rachael Kaiman contributed this Note and would like to thank Florida State Uni-
versity College of Law Professor B.J. Priester for his invaluable insights. 
 7. 918 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 2005). 
 8. Rachael Kaiman contributed this Note and would like to thank Donna Blanton, 
Esq. with Radey Thomas Yon & Clark, P.A. for her invaluable insights. 
 9. 916 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 2005). 
 10. Katy Donlan contributed this Note and would like to thank Florida State Univer-
sity College of Law Legal Writing Instructor Susan Bodell for her invaluable insights.  
 11. 923 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2005). 
 12. Judith Brodkin contributed this Note. 
 13. See, e.g., Maddox v. State, 31 Fla. L. Weekly S24, S26 (Fla. Jan. 12, 2006) 
(Cantero, J., dissenting) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 
1931) (“When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear 
and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpreta-
tion and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.”)); 
McLaughlin v. State, 721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998) (“When the language of the statute 
is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion 
for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be 
given its plain and obvious meaning.”); State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973) (“Where 
the legislative intent as evidenced by a statute is plain and unambiguous, then there is no 
necessity for any construction or interpretation of the statute and the courts need only give 
effect to the plain meaning of its terms.”). 
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tory interpretation should be used only when the plain meaning of 
the statute would lead to an unreasonable conclusion.14  
 The majority opinion in Maddox v. State15 has blurred the separa-
tion of powers within Florida by substituting the court’s own inter-
pretation of the statute in place of the legislature’s plain meaning. 
The issue in Maddox was whether the phrase “any trial” in section 
319.650(9), Florida Statutes,16 was clear and required no interpreta-
tion or whether it was ambiguous and required interpretation.17 The 
majority chose the latter position, disapproving of the decision in 
Dixon v. State18 and upholding the result reached by the lower court 
in Maddox v. State.19 The court reasoned:  
When section 316.650 is read in the context in which it is found 
and in conjunction with related statutory provisions, the reason-
able construction of this statutory provision is that the Legislature 
intended only to exclude traffic citations in a more limited fashion 
in matters with issues related to the operation, maintenance or 
use of the motor vehicle. To hold otherwise would expand the scope 
of this statute unreasonably and lead to absurd results.20 
This Note explores the reasoning of the majority and dissent. It puts 
forth the argument that the majority should not have swayed from 
the plain meaning of the statute because, although the result of ap-
plying the plain meaning may not have been ideal, it was not unrea-
sonable. Whether to allow an exception for citations to be introduced 
into evidence pursuant section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes, was a 
decision for the legislature, not the court.  
 This case involved a routine traffic stop by a Polk County deputy 
sheriff.21 The driver, Robert Maddox, gave the officer a false name 
(“Nathaniel Lewis Maddox”), and the officer issued an improper lane 
change citation and a citation for failure to produce proof of insur-
ance to Nathanial Maddox.22 During the traffic stop, a second deputy 
searched the car and found an identification card that identified 
Maddox as Robert Edwin Maddox.23 It was discovered that Robert 
Maddox’s driver’s license was suspended, so the first deputy kept the 
first two citations he had issued to Nathaniel Maddox and issued a 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984).  
 15. Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S24 (majority opinion). 
 16. FLA. STAT. § 316.650(9) (2001) (“Such citations shall not be admissible evidence in 
any trial.”). 
 17. Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S24. 
 18. 812 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). 
 19. 862 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S24. 
 20. Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S25-26. 
 21. Id. at S24. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
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new citation to Robert Maddox for driving with a suspended license.24 
While Maddox was in custody, he admitted that Nathaniel was his 
brother, and he was charged with two counts of forgery for signing 
the citations issued to Nathaniel and with two counts of uttering a 
forged instrument.25  
 The forged traffic citations were allowed into evidence during the 
trial, and Maddox was convicted. This created a conflict with the 
First District Court of Appeal’s (“First District”) decision in Dixon 
where the court held that the language of section 319.650(9), Florida 
Statutes, (2001) was unambiguous and not subject to judicial inter-
pretation.26 The Second District Court of Appeal (“Second District”) 
addressed the argument that the forged traffic tickets were inadmis-
sible pursuant to section 319.650(9), by concluding that the tickets 
“were not citations as contemplated by the statute, but rather were 
documentary evidence of Maddox’s criminal conduct.”27 
 The Florida Supreme Court upheld Maddox’s conviction by resort-
ing to statutory interpretation. The majority explored chapter 316, 
Florida Statutes, entitled “Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law,” in 
which the statute at issue was found.28 It looked at the purpose of the 
Act and the description of the bill from when it was enacted in 1971, 
and it determined that “a strict literal reading of the phrase ‘any trial,’ 
as suggested by Maddox and endorsed by the First District in Dixon, 
would inappropriately extend the effects of this statutory provision far 
beyond the scope of that which was intended by the Legislature.”29 The 
majority also agreed with the Second District’s reasoning.30 
 Another statutory interpretation tool the majority used was to ex-
amine in context how the term “any trial” fit within the larger stat-
ute and if its meaning was consistent with the entire chapter. The 
example used by the court was another statute from chapter 316 
which states that “neither a crash report nor a statement made in 
                                                                                                                     
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at S24. 
 26. See generally Dixon v. State, 812 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). After being 
stopped by an officer for several traffic violations, Dixon gave a false name to the officer. 
The name was placed on the traffic ticket, which Dixon signed using the false name. He 
was charged with forgery under section 831.01, Florida Statutes, (2000) and driving with-
out a valid driver’s license. The First District determined that the language of section 
319.650(9) was unambiguous and not subject to judicial interpretation. The court held that 
the language in section 319.650(9) required exclusion of forged citations in the State’s 
prosecution of forgery. Dixon, 812 So. 2d 595. 
 27. The Second District determined that the trial court did not err in allowing the 
traffic citations into evidence because the purpose of the statute was to protect the person 
to whom the citation was issued, and the charges of the first two tickets were not pending 
against anyone because they were withdrawn after it was discovered that Robert was not 
Nathaniel. Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S24. 
 28. Id. at S25. 
 29. Id.  
 30. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
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connection with such a report ‘shall be used as evidence in any trial, 
civil or criminal.’ ”31 The majority construed this as meaning that the 
phrase “any trial” in section 316.650(9) “was intended to refer to the 
use of traffic citations in proceedings in which the manner or method 
of the operation, maintenance or use of a vehicle is the issue in con-
troversy” because it was not followed by “civil or criminal.”32 
 The majority’s final point was that interpreting “any trial” to mean 
all proceedings in a court of law would lead to “unreasonable or ridicu-
lous” results.33 Interpreting the statute this way, the majority sug-
gested, would do away with all prosecutions for forgery of traffic cita-
tions because in order to convict a person of forgery, the State must 
show that the alleged forged document is, in fact, a “public document” 
within section 831.01, Florida Statutes,34 and it would be unable to do 
that if it could not introduce the actual document.35 The majority at-
tempted to quell the dissent’s argument that the citation may contain 
“unflattering, legally irrelevant information” and prejudice the defen-
dant by suggesting that the unflattering information may be redacted 
if it does not relate to the forgery charge.36 
 Justice Cantero dissented in an opinion in which Chief Justice 
Pariente and Justice Quince concurred. The dissent agreed with the 
First District’s holding in Dixon and the argument by Maddox that 
the statute was unambiguous; therefore, it argued that the plain 
meaning of the statute should have applied to this case.37 Justice 
Cantero stated that the statute was simple and clear because the 
phrase “ ‘[a]ny trial’ means literally any trial.”38 The dissent con-
cluded that the legislature could have a rational basis for excluding 
traffic citations from all trials and the decision to allow the use of ci-
tations should be left to the legislature.39 The dissent cited Dixon and 
two other cases where courts held that traffic citations were not ad-
missible in any trial.40 
 The dissent disagreed with the majority’s analysis that since the 
crash report provision includes the words “civil or criminal” after “any 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S25 (citing FLA. STAT. § 316.066(4) (2001)).  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. FLA. STAT. § 831.01 (2005).  
 35. Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S25. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at S26 (Cantero, J., dissenting). The dissent analyzed the plain meaning of the 
statute as being the most reliable expression of legislative intent and stated if the statute 
is unambiguous, the court is not authorized to interpret it another way; therefore, the 
plain meaning must be honored. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. (citing Dixon v. State, 812 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)); see State v. Veil-
leux, 859 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), review denied, 880 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 2004); State 
v. Martinez, 870 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). 
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trial,” that it is more expansive than “any trial” without the modifiers 
in section 316.650(9).41 The dissent argued that “any trial” by itself is 
“as expansive as possible” and adding a modifier like “civil or criminal” 
would only emphasize or even restrict the provision’s scope.42  
 The dissent argued that the court should only substitute its own 
judgment when absolutely necessary and, in this case, the plain 
meaning of the statute would not lead to an absurd result; therefore, 
the court should not have substituted its judgment for that of the leg-
islature.43 The dissent stated that “[t]he absurdity doctrine should be 
reserved for cases where applying the plain meaning would border on 
irrationality,” because a broader application of the doctrine would 
“threaten to undermine the separation of powers.”44 In this case, cita-
tions, while probative in forgery trials, “still pose a substantial risk of 
prejudice to the defendant,” and the legislature could have decided 
that the burden outweighed the benefit.45  
 The dissent gave three reasons why the legislature could reasona-
bly allow citations to be purely procedural and not allow them in 
“any trial.”46 First, it allows the defendant to confront the officer by 
ensuring the officer shows up in court and gives firsthand testimony, 
rather than relying on the ticket.47 Second, citations should be omit-
ted from “any trial” because it “ensure[s] that officers will testify only 
about the facts they witnessed, rather than their legal relevance.”48 
Third, excluding citations will protect defendants “from the prejudice 
caused by unflattering, legally irrelevant information recorded on the 
citation.”49 What an officer thinks is factually pertinent to the traffic 
stop can be different from what a court will find legally relevant.50 
 The dissent also argued that the ticket could prejudice the defen-
dant in a forgery trial because the jury could believe that the defen-
dant actually committed the underlying traffic offense, which could 
influence its decision on the forgery charge.51 The dissent pointed out 
that this discussion does not suggest that traffic citations should be 
excluded, only that it would not be absurd to exclude them.52 The dis-
sent reiterated, “In the absence of absurdity, we have a responsibility 
to the Legislature, which carefully selected the words, and to defen-
                                                                                                                     
 41. Maddox, 31 Fla. L. Weekly at S26-27. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at S27. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at S27-28. 
 48. Id. at S28. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id.  
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dants, whose liberty possibly hinges upon them, to enforce the stat-
ute as written.”53 
 The majority’s holding oversteps the judiciary’s boundary by tak-
ing on the legislature’s role. Allowing the judiciary to substitute its 
own judgment of what a statute means any time it thinks an outcome 
is unjust is a serious breach of separation of powers.54 This holding 
gives power to the judiciary that it should not have, as it could open 
the door for courts to apply their own interpretations to statutes 
whenever the outcome does not fit with the courts’ ideals. 
 The term “any,” has been the center of other statutory interpreta-
tion controversies. A federal firearms statute that contained the 
phrase “any court” caused a circuit split over whether that phrase 
meant domestic and foreign courts, or just domestic courts.55 In 
Small v. United States,56 the Supreme Court put the controversy to 
rest by holding that the phrase referred only to domestic courts, but 
as the dissent argued, that decision was unfounded and unwise.57 For 
many of the same reasons argued by the dissent in Small, the out-
come in Maddox should have been different.58  
 The dissent in Maddox has convincingly argued that the statute’s 
plain meaning is not absurd and that the plain meaning should have 
been followed.59 The cases that have followed Dixon and interpreted 
“any court” to literally mean “any court” are strong evidence that the 
                                                                                                                     
 53. Id. For a discussion on the circuit split, see Tracey A. Basler, Does “Any” Mean 
“All” or Does “Any” Mean “Some”? An Analysis of the “Any Court” Ambiguity of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act and Whether Foreign Convictions Count as Predicate Convictions, 37 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 147 (2003). 
 54. Lee G. Lester, Note, Small v. United States: Defining “Any” as a Subset of “Any,” 
40 U. RICH. L. REV. 631, 650 (2006) (“The fact that the court might have drawn the line dif-
ferently is not a matter for judicial, but for legislative action. In the wake of Small, how-
ever, future courts may usurp the power of Congress by following the majority rationale 
and loosely construing or even inventing new canons of statutory interpretation instead of 
following the law as it has been codified.”).  
 55. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted 
in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to 
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, 
any firearm or ammunition . . . .”). 
 56. 125 S. Ct. at 1752 (2005). 
 57. Id.; see also Lester, supra note 54, at 631 (siding with the dissent in Small).  
 58. See Small, 125 S. Ct. at 1764 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Pub. Citizen v. DOJ, 
491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (“[Unpopular results] 
certainly present no occasion to employ, nor does the Court invoke, the canon against ab-
surdities. We should employ that canon only ‘where the result of applying the plain lan-
guage would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where it is quite impossible that Congress 
could have intended the result . . . and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be ob-
vious to most anyone.’ ”). 
 59. For a discussion of the prejudicial value of traffic citations, see Sheryl L. Mus-
grove & David W. Gross, Use of a Traffic Citation in a Subsequent Related Civil Proceed-
ing, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 135 (1996). 
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statute’s plain meaning should have been adhered to in Maddox.60 In 
addition, the legislature recently amended this statute narrowly to 
allow the admission of traffic citations to prove forgery and a few 
other specific instances.61 If “any trial” really only referred to “pro-
ceedings in which the manner or method of the operation, mainte-
nance or use of a vehicle is the issue in controversy,”62 the legislature 
could have amended the statute that way, but it did not. Statutes can 
always be interpreted in some way to seem ambiguous. If courts are 
allowed to find the slightest ambiguity and tweak the law to favor 
their outcome, the legislature will become much weaker. Statutes 
may not always appear to be logical, and some may even seem un-
wise, but as long as the plain meaning is unambiguous and any ra-
tional explanation can be determined, the court should adhere to that 
plain meaning.  
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS USE OF 
PUBLIC MONIES TO FUND PRIVATE ALTERNATIVE TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
VIOLATES THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION—Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 
392 (Fla. 2006). 
 The Florida Constitution requires that the State provide for “the 
education of all children residing within its borders . . . a uniform, ef-
ficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools 
that allows students to obtain a high quality education.”63 In the 
most recent case concerning the continuing controversy over school 
vouchers, the Florida Supreme Court held the state law, authorizing 
a system of vouchers known as the Opportunity Scholarship Program 
(OSP), violated this constitutional mandate.64 In its landmark deci-
sion, Bush v. Holmes, the Florida Supreme Court became the first 
court nationwide to hold that the state has “a duty to educate stu-
dents in public schools.”65   
 The OSP was one of several educational reforms at the center of 
Governor Jeb Bush’s A+ Plan for Education, designed to implement 
standards for student achievement, assess and publish educational 
performance, and provide a system of accountability for schools based 
                                                                                                                     
 60. See cases cited supra note 40; see also Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola v. Stone, 
650 So. 2d 676, 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding evaluation based on traffic citation should 
have been excluded under section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes). 
 61. FLA. STAT. § 316.650(9) (2005) (“Such citations shall not be admissible evidence in 
any trial, except when used as evidence of falsification, forgery, uttering, fraud, or perjury, 
or when used as physical evidence resulting from a forensic examination of the citation.”). 
 62. Maddox v. State, 31 Fla. L. Weekly S24, S25 (Fla. Jan. 12, 2006). 
 63. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a). 
 64. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006); see also FLA. STAT. § 1002.38 (2005). 
 65. Greg Toppo, Florida Supreme Court Strikes Down School Vouchers, USA TODAY, 
Jan. 5, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-01-05-florida-school-
vouchers_x.htm?POE=NEWISVA.  
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upon performance results.66 A cornerstone of this educational initia-
tive is the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT), taken 
annually by public school students in grades three through eleven.67 
Based upon both student FCAT “performance and progress,” individ-
ual schools are graded A, B, C, D or F, with schools receiving an F 
designated as failing.68 The OSP provided two alternatives for stu-
dents who were in public schools found by the State to be failing for 
two out of four consecutive years. The student could either attend a 
nonfailing public school, or the student’s share of public education 
funds could be applied towards tuition for an eligible private school.69 
Requirements for private school eligibility included, among other 
things, antidiscrimination provisions, compliance with local health 
and safety codes, curriculum deemed appropriate by a private school 
accrediting body, and acceptance of a student’s pro rata share of pub-
lic education funds as full tuition and fees.70 As the majority in Bush 
v. Holmes pointed out, “the private school’s curriculum and teachers 
are not subject to the same standards” as public schools.71  
 In Bush v. Holmes, parents of children in Florida public schools as 
well as numerous organizations, including teacher’s unions and the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), brought suit in circuit court 
alleging that the OSP was unconstitutional under article I, section 3 
and article IX, sections 1 and 6 of the Florida Constitution, as well as 
attacking its federal constitutionality under the Establishment 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.72 Before the suit reached the Florida 
Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a voucher pro-
gram similar to Florida’s OSP, the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship 
Program, did not violate the constitutional requirements of the Es-
tablishment Clause.73 This decision led to a voluntary dismissal of 
plaintiff’s claims of unconstitutionality under the Establishment 
Clause.74 In its decision, the Florida Supreme Court was faced only 
with the determination of whether the portion of the OSP enabling 
students of underperforming public schools to use public funding for 
a private education violated the Florida Constitution.75   
 The majority found the OSP violated the Florida Constitution and 
based its opinion upon three findings. First, free public schools are 
                                                                                                                     
 66. See A+ Plan for Education, http://eogtmp.sto.fl.gov/html/a__plan_for_education.html 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2006). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. FLA. STAT. § 1002.38(2)(a), (3) (2005). 
 70. Id. § 1002.38(4). 
 71. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 409 (Fla. 2006). 
 72. Id. at 397-99. 
 73. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 74. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 399. 
 75. Id. 
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the sole means prescribed by the constitution “for the state to provide 
for the education of Florida’s children.”76 Second, the OSP voucher 
system diverts funding from public schools into private schools to the 
detriment of the constitutionally required, high quality, free public 
schools.77 Finally, because private schools are not subject to the same 
standards and regulations as public schools, the constitutional re-
quirement of uniformity is not met.78 
 In its precedent holding that public schools are the exclusive means 
constitutionally authorized for supplying the educational needs of 
Florida’s children, the court relied almost entirely upon the principles 
of statutory construction, specifically in pari materia, which requires 
statutes be construed together in order to resolve inconsistencies,79 
and expressio unius est exclusion alterius, or “the expression of one 
thing implies the exclusion of another.”80 Historically, the court has 
used expressio unis to prevent the legislature from enacting a statute 
that would defeat the purpose of a constitutional provision prescribing 
a specific manner of performance.81 In Holmes, the court conceded that 
application of this principle is limited to situations in which a statute 
conflicts with the “primary purpose of the relevant constitutional pro-
vision,”82 and it stated (rather than demonstrated) that the OSP at is-
sue presents just such an applicable occasion. Through utilization of 
both in pari materia and expressio unis, the court found article IX, sec-
tion 1(a) serves as both a mandate (it is the “paramount duty of the 
state to make adequate provision for the education of all children re-
siding within its borders”)83 and a “restriction on the execution of this 
mandate”84 (“made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure and 
high quality system of free public schools”85). 
 Although the majority opinion represents the current state of the 
law in this area, its persuasive force was weakened by an impres-
sively reasoned dissent supported by drafter intent. The dissent be-
gins by criticizing the majority’s alleged failure to follow the most 
fundamental principal of statutory construction, that legislation be 
presumed constitutional and every effort made to resolve any doubt 
in favor of constitutionality.86 It goes on to present the text of article 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Id. at 398. 
 77. Id. at 409. 
 78. Id. at 409-10. 
 79. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004).  
 80. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 407. 
 81. See Weinberger v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of St. Johns County, 112 So. 253, 256 
(Fla. 1927).  
 82. See Bush, 919 So. 2d at 408.  
 83. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a). 
 84. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 406. 
 85. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a). 
 86. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 413 (Bell, J., dissenting). 
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IX, section 1 as plain and unambiguous with no textual exclusivity 
requirement either expressed or implied87 and lacking any evidence 
that voters or drafters intended to preclude the legislature from pro-
viding public funds for private alternatives to failing schools.88 The 
dissent supported its claims of intended consequence with the com-
ments from one member of the Constitution Revision Commission, 
who stated the Commission’s goal was to “raise the constitutional 
standard for education,” and “does not address” “the education of our 
children in the state mov[ing] in various directions, whether it be 
charter schools, private schools, [or] public schools.”89 Likewise, the 
dissent pointed to comments of other commissioners “that the 
amendments to article IX should not limit the legislature’s authority 
to determine the best method for providing education in Florida.”90 
The dissent provided a compelling case that article IX neither ex-
pressly or impliedly limits the legislature’s ability to educate children 
exclusively to public schools, nor was it intended to do so.  
 In further scrutiny, the reasoning of the majority and its applica-
tion of expressio unis lacks logical flow. As previously mentioned, the 
court distinguished its failure to follow this tenant of statutory con-
struction in another case based upon its determination that the stat-
ute then at issue was not in conflict with the “primary purpose of the 
relevant constitutional provision.”91 In Holmes, however, the court of-
fered a thorough discussion of the language and history of the educa-
tional articles of Florida’s Constitution ultimately stating that they 
impose “a maximum duty on the State to provide for education.”92 If 
one concludes this to be the “primary purpose of the relevant consti-
tutional provision,”93 it is unclear then why the court chose to apply 
expressio unis without first demonstrating the conflict between the 
OSP and the State’s duty to provide for education. 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Id. at 416 (“This mandate is to make adequate provision for a public school sys-
tem. The text does not provide that the government’s provision for education shall be ‘by’ 
or ‘through’ a system of free public schools.”). 
 88. Id. at 416-17. 
 89. Id. at 419. 
 90. Id. at 420; see also Florida Constitution Revision Commission, Meeting Proceed-
ings for January 15th, 1998, at 296-97, http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/minutes.html [hereinaf-
ter CRC Jan. 15] (statement of Commissioner Thompson expressing a desire to ensure the 
legislature retains the freedom to determine how best to provide education); Florida Con-
stitution Revision Commission, Meeting Proceedings for February 26, 1998, at 54-55, 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/minutes.html (statement of Commissioner Evans conveying 
fear that the heightened importance of education in article IX would transfer power from 
the voters to the courts); CRC Jan. 15, supra, at 262-69 (statement of Commissioner Lang-
ley expressing concern that the heightened importance of education in article IX would 
transform the Florida Supreme Court into the State Board of Education). 
 91. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 408 (majority opinion). 
 92. Id. at 404. 
 93. Id. at 408. 
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 Regardless of how persuasive one finds the court’s use of statutory 
construction to invalidate OSP, the court’s second finding appears 
significantly less persuasive. The majority reasoned that in diverting 
public funds from public to private schools, “the OSP by its very na-
ture undermines the system of ‘high quality’ free public schools,”94 
and holds that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the state from using pub-
lic monies to fund a private alternative to the public school system.”95 
However, as the dissent points out, there was no evidence brought in 
the facial challenge to the OSP that this program was resulting in a 
less than high quality system of free public schools.96 Additionally, 
the dissent noted that while article IX, section 6 has been in Florida’s 
Constitution for over 150 years, it has never been held to proscribe 
the State from providing public funds to institutions of private edu-
cation and provided a lengthy list of such occasions.97 
 Finally, the majority based its opinion upon the finding that since 
private schools are not subject to the same standards, regulation, and 
control as public schools, they violate the criterion put forth in article 
IX, section 1(a) that Florida’s system of free public schools be uni-
form.98 However, this seems to be the majority’s least relevant find-
ing as the alternative of public funding for a private education seem-
ingly would not affect the uniformity of the system of free public 
schools required. As the statute appears only to speak to the re-
quirements of this free system of public schools, it seems quite a 
stretch to find the lack of identical qualifications for private schools 
not in compliance with the uniformity requirement of public schools. 
 The majority in Bush v. Holmes attempted to limit the scope and im-
plications of its decision specifically delineating “Other Programs Unaf-
fected.”99 Here, the court distinguished the OSP from another educa-
tional program which provides public funding to private schools for ex-
ceptional students where there is a lack of special services in the stu-
dent’s school district.100 The court stated that such a program for excep-
tional students is “structurally different from the OSP, which provides a 
systematic private school alternative.”101 The court did not, however, 
address other scholarship programs such as the John M. McKay Schol-
arships for Students with Disabilities Program, the largest and fastest-
growing scholarship program in Florida,102 which allows parents to 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Id. at 409. 
 95. Id. at 408.  
 96. Id. at 415 (Bell, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. at 421-23. 
 98. Id. at 410 (majority opinion). 
 99. Id. at 411. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 412. 
 102. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EDUCATION & 
PARENTAL CHOICE, JOHN M. MCKAY SCHOLARSHIPS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 
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chose whether to send their child to a public or private school on public 
funding without the requirement that the public school be unable to ac-
commodate the special needs of the student, or Florida’s Corporate Tax 
Credit Scholarship program, which allows tax credits for corporations 
providing underprivileged students scholarships to attend private 
schools.103 While Department of Education statistics show the OSP pro-
vided scholarships to only 733 children in the 2005-2006 school year,104 
over 16,144 students took advantage of McKay Scholarships,105 and 
13,497 participated in the Corporate Tax Credit Scholarship program 
during this same school year.106 Although the Bush v. Holmes opinion 
seems ominous for these other programs, the educational fate of nearly 
30,000 students, for now, remains unknown. 
 Ultimately, the dissent in Bush v. Holmes comes across as the more 
intellectually honest discussion of the challenged litigation, relevant 
constitutional provisions, and powers delegated to both the legislature 
and judiciary. Though this perspective did not prevail, it is unlikely 
this case will serve as the final word in Florida’s ongoing debate over 
the validity of vouchers. While Governor Bush intends to “look for 
ways to continue the voucher programs, including private funding, 
changing state law and amending the Florida Constitution,”107 this de-
cision will likely serve as difficult precedent for proponents of Florida’s 
two largest scholarship programs to overcome. 
CRIMINAL LAW—SCOPE OF THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
EXCEPTION—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT UNDER THE 
SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED, A WARRANTLESS ENTRY WAS 
JUSTIFIED BASED UPON A REASONABLE BELIEF OF MEDICAL 
EMERGENCY—Riggs v. State (Riggs II), 918 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2005). 
 The Fourth Amendment108 protects citizens from unreasonable 
searches and seizures and generally requires a warrant, based on 
                                                                                                                     
PROGRAM, http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/Information/McKay/files/Fast_Facts_McKay.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2006) [hereinafter MCKAY SCHOLARSHIPS]. 
 103. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EDUCATION & PARENTAL 
CHOICE, CORPORATE TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM, http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/   
Information/CTC/fast_facts.asp (last visited Mar. 16, 2006) [hereinafter CORPORATE TAX CREDIT 
SCHOLARSHIPS]. 
 104. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EDUCATION & 
PARENTAL CHOICE, OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM, http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/  
Information/OSP/files/Fast_Facts_OSP.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2006). 
 105. MCKAY SCHOLARSHIPS, supra note 102. 
 106. CORPORATE TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIPS, supra note 103. 
 107. Bill Kaczor, Florida Supreme Court Declares Vouchers Unconstitutional, MIAMI 
HERALD, Jan. 5, 2006, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/13556951.htm. 
 108. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
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probable cause for a search or seizure.109 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has specifically stated that “physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is di-
rected.”110 However, the Amendment does not guarantee that a search 
of an individual’s home will never be made absent consent or a war-
rant, only that a search will not be “unreasonable.”111 In accordance 
with this understanding, the Court has recognized limited exceptions 
whereby a warrantless entry would be justified, one of which is known 
as the “exigent circumstances”112 exception. This exception deals with 
an “emergency or dangerous situation . . . that would justify a war-
rantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or 
search.”113 Recently, the Florida Supreme Court explored the scope of 
the exigent circumstances exception in Riggs v. State (Riggs II).114 Re-
solving a conflict between the First and Second District Courts of Ap-
peal, the court unanimously held that two sheriff’s deputies acted in 
conformity with the Fourth Amendment and within the bounds of the 
exigent circumstances exception when they were called to an apart-
ment complex, found a four-year old child had been wandering there 
naked and alone, made reasonable inferences that there was a medical 
emergency of a caretaker, and thus entered an apartment without a 
warrant.115 Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court should 
not have suppressed evidence of marijuana that was in plain view and 
seized after the warrantless entry.116 Although the court’s opinion ap-
pears simple, straightforward, and persuasive, the result has many 
potential implications in the area of search and seizure law and for the 
parameters of the exigent circumstances exception. This Note briefly 
explores the facts and foundational law related to Riggs II and then 
addresses concerns stemming from the opinion. Ultimately, this Note 
questions the certainty and confidence with which the court provided 
its holding and questions whether the exigent circumstances exception 
has been overbroadened. 
 In rendering its decision, the court sided with the Second District 
in Florida v. Riggs (Riggs I),117 finding that exigent circumstances 
                                                                                                                     
 109. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). 
 110. Id. (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). 
 111. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990). 
 112. Payton, 445 U.S. at 583. 
 113. Id. 
 114. 918 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2005). 
 115. Id. at 282.  
 116. Id. at 283. See also Davis v. State, 834 So. 2d 322, 327 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). “[I]f 
the police enter a home under exigent circumstances and, prior to making a determination 
that the exigency no longer exists, find contraband in plain view, they may lawfully seize 
the illegal items.” Id. 
 117. 890 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). 
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justified a warrantless entry, and disapproved of Eason v. State,118 
the First District’s case with similar facts, to the extent that it con-
flicted with the court’s opinion in Riggs II.119 In Eason, a woman 
called the police after taking a child into her home, whom she had 
found wandering in the parking lot of her apartment complex.120 The 
child appeared to be about two or three years old and, with the police 
nearby, specifically pointed to the front door of an apartment and 
said his mother was inside.121 After receiving no response to knocks, 
the police entered the apartment because they were concerned there 
may have been a burglary or someone inside in need of help.122 The 
officers found the child’s caretaker but no emergency, and they also 
found marijuana and paraphernalia in plain view.123 The trial court 
denied Eason’s motion to suppress the evidence seized, finding the 
entry was lawful.124 The First District reversed, however, concluding 
that the officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe exigent 
circumstances existed.125 The court stated the officers lacked reason-
able grounds for such a belief since there was no indication the child 
had been abused or was in danger of abuse, no evidence suggesting a 
need for medical assistance, and no evidence of a murder or rob-
bery.126 Dissenting, Chief Judge Smith agreed with the trial court 
that the warrantless entry was reasonable, based upon the officers’ 
concern for the condition of the child’s mother.127 Chief Judge Smith 
expressed the view that the majority’s focus on the safety and wel-
fare of the child was misplaced.128 “[T]his episode developed substan-
tially beyond a mere ‘lost child’ incident”129 and the need to act was 
clear and within the scope of police duties.130  
 In Riggs I and II, two sheriff’s deputies were summoned to a Flor-
ida apartment complex at three o’clock one January morning.131 A 
four-year-old girl had been seen walking there, naked and alone, al-
though by the time the deputies arrived she was within the custody 
of local residents.132 The child could not identify which apartment 
                                                                                                                     
 118. 546 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).  
 119. Riggs II, 918 So. 2d at 276. 
 120. Eason, 546 So. 2d at 58. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 59. 
 126. Id. at 58-59. 
 127. Id. at 61 (Smith, C.J., dissenting). 
 128. See id. at 60-61. 
 129. Id. at 61. 
 130. Id. at 60-61 (quoting the scope of police duties that may lead to the need for entry 
of private premises without a warrant from WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.6 (2d ed. 1987)). 
 131. Riggs v. State (Riggs II), 918 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. 2005). 
 132. Id. 
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was her own, and the deputies decided to try and find the child’s 
caregiver by searching the three-story complex door by door.133 When 
searching the second level, the deputies found that all the doors were 
closed except one, which was open slightly and through which offi-
cers could see some light.134 After pounding on the door, identifying 
themselves, and receiving no response, the officers entered the 
apartment, believing that it was the apartment from which the child 
had come and that something had happened to the child’s care-
giver.135 After entering, the officers found on a coffee table a plastic 
cigar tube containing seeds, which later were established to be mari-
juana, and seven potted marijuana plants in the second of three 
rooms they sequentially checked.136 In the third room, the officers 
found Norris Riggs and a woman whom the officers later discovered 
was the child’s babysitter.137 Riggs was arrested and confessed to 
growing marijuana but pled not guilty and moved to suppress the 
evidence of marijuana.138 At the suppression hearing, the State al-
leged that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry, and 
thus, the officers were able to seize items in plain view.139 Basing its 
ruling on Eason, the trial court granted the motion to suppress.140 On 
appeal, the Second District reversed, adopting the reasoning of Chief 
Judge Smith’s dissent in Eason.141 Expressing the view that the offi-
cers entered the apartment based on their duty to assure the welfare 
of the child’s caregiver and based on circumstances justifying such a 
concern, the court concluded the warrantless entry was justified and 
therefore items in plain view could lawfully be seized.142 
 The Florida Supreme Court agreed to review Riggs I in order to re-
solve the conflict between the First and Second Districts related to the 
application and scope of the exigent circumstances exception. Consid-
ering the issue under a de novo standard of review,143 the court briefly 
reviewed the history of the exception before beginning its analysis. 
Recognizing that warrants are generally required to enter an individ-
ual’s private property, the court noted the narrow circumstances in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the exigent circumstances 
exception, namely for purposes of pursuing a fleeing felon, preventing 
destruction of evidence, searching after a lawful arrest, and fighting 
                                                                                                                     
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 277. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. State v. Riggs (Riggs I), 890 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). 
 142. Id. at 467-68. 
 143. Riggs II, 918 So. 2d at 278. 
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fires.144 The court followed this by summarizing Florida’s own applica-
tion of the exigent circumstances exception, stating that “where safety 
is threatened and time is of the essence, we have recognized that ‘the 
need to protect life and to prevent serious bodily injury provides justi-
fication for an otherwise invalid entry.’ ”145 The exigent circumstance 
presented by both Eason and Riggs I was a “feared medical emer-
gency.”146 Although not one of the named U.S. Supreme Court excep-
tions above, the Florida Supreme Court discussed Supreme Court 
dicta that gave a clear indication the Court would approve of a war-
rantless entry in response to the belief of a need for immediate medical 
assistance.147 The court proceeded to note its own precedent, which has 
explicitly addressed and upheld warrantless entries based upon feared 
medical emergencies, although such cases did not involve a lost child 
in an apartment complex.148 In situations of a feared medical emer-
gency, “the sanctity of human life becomes more important than the 
sanctity of the home.”149 Finally, the court applied the exception to the 
circumstances leading up to Riggs’ arrest.  
 Riggs argued the warrantless entry was unreasonable for two rea-
sons: (1) “the deputies lacked a sufficient objective basis for fearing a 
medical emergency,” and (2) there was no basis to link any potential 
emergency with his apartment.150 Dispelling the first contention, the 
court opined that because the girl was only four years old, was alone 
outside in the middle of the night, and was not wearing any clothes, 
sufficient evidence existed to infer that there was “grossly negligent 
supervision or an emergency involving the child’s caretaker.”151 Re-
garding the second claim, the court conceded that the deputies lacked 
certainty the girl came from Riggs’ apartment, but pointed out that 
certainty is not required when acting upon fear of a medical emer-
gency.152 In accordance with the text of the Fourth Amendment, the 
requirement is that “the police reasonably believe that an emergency 
exists.”153 Based on the child’s proximity to the particular apartment 
complex, the fact of light coming from an open door at three o’clock in 
the morning, and the lack of response to repeated knocks, the court 
believed the deputies were justified in their belief of a feared medical 
                                                                                                                     
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 279 (quoting Arango v. State, 411 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1982)). 
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emergency.154 Thus, the court held that the sheriff’s deputies acted 
“reasonably and consistent with the Fourth Amendment,” and the 
trial court erred in suppressing the evidence.155 
 In Riggs II, the court found that the circumstances with which the 
officers were faced, when taken as a whole, led to a reasonable infer-
ence that a medical emergency existed. Arguably, however, other in-
ferences were available. As the court suggested itself, possibly the 
situation was one of negligent supervision,156 in which case one could 
argue warrantless entry was not at all necessary but instead child 
services should have been contacted and the child taken into custody. 
Possibly the child was able to open the door to the apartment and 
leave on her own and did so while her caretaker(s) was sleeping. 
Maybe the child was merely left in the parking lot, abandoned by a 
parent, and had no link at all to any of the apartments. In spite of 
the fact that the apartment entered here had its door open and a 
light on, the fact that the apartment complex where the deputies 
searched “contained as many as fifty apartments”157 reduced the like-
lihood that the wandering child was linked to any one even if the 
child did live there. Therefore, although the inference made by the 
deputies was legitimately one reasonable inference, the fact that 
other reasonable inferences existed may detract from the strength of 
that inference. The court failed to delineate in its opinion how strong 
a reasonable inference must be to justify a warrantless entry.  
 Clearly, there is a significant conflict between the strong, albeit 
rebuttable, presumption that a warrant is needed to enter an indi-
vidual’s private property158 and the requirement of a reasonable be-
lief of a need for immediate medical assistance to get around that 
presumption. Given that protecting the privacy of the home is argua-
bly the main purpose behind the wording of the Fourth Amend-
ment,159 it is questionable that a reasonable inference that a medical 
emergency exists, when numerous other reasonable inferences also 
exist, is strong enough to justify a warrantless search. The court in 
Riggs II did not provide guidance regarding whether the existence of 
multiple reasonable inferences, some of which would not justify a 
warrantless entry, would prevent any one on its own from justifying 
such an entry. A lack of guidance regarding the strength of the rea-
sonable inference could arguably lead to a slippery slope and the ex-
pansion of a doctrine which itself is supposed to be very narrow.  
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 As Chief Judge Smith addressed in his dissent in Eason, “the police 
have ‘complex and multiple tasks to perform’ ”160 besides the responsi-
bility of identifying and dealing with those who have violated the 
law.161 For example, they are relied on to bring assistance to those 
threatened with physical harm, resolve conflict, and establish a sense 
of security in a community.162 In deciding whether the entry is reason-
able based on the exigent circumstances exception, courts must look at 
the totality of existing circumstances and base the analysis of reason-
ableness on that with which the officer was faced.163 Although a home-
owner might believe the only reasonable belief that could justify entry 
of a home would be near certainty of an emergency, assessing reason-
ableness from a homeowner’s perspective fails to take account for the 
multiple roles of police officers, their work experience, and the speed 
with which they must often make the decision to enter private prop-
erty or postpone an entry to get a warrant. Failing to give officers lati-
tude and deference in making such decisions could arguably hinder an 
officer’s ability to act according to his belief of what is necessary, and it 
could ultimately work against the interests of those whom he is trying 
to protect. Therefore, while the failure of the court to lay out more spe-
cific guidelines regarding what constitutes a reasonable belief has the 
drawback of exposing the exception to overreaching, it is advantageous 
in that it respects the domain of police officers and their need to act 
according to the varying demands that arise from their numerous and 
varied responsibilities. 
 As quoted in Riggs II, the U.S. Supreme Court has said, “Absent 
some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a 
magistrate between the citizen and the police. . . . It was done so that 
an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in or-
der to enforce the law.”164 An additional question thus raised by this 
case is whether the scrutiny applied to a warrantless entry differs 
between situations where a police officer is entering for a law en-
forcement purpose and situations where an officer enters for a non-
law enforcement purpose, such as the feared medical emergency cir-
cumstance at issue in Riggs II. In the former situation, there is ar-
guably a greater possibility and desire on the part of police officers to 
find evidence that may prove guilt of a crime, for which the conse-
quences to the individual whose privacy was invaded may be severe. 
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in United States v. United States Dis-
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trict Court,165 “[Executive officers] charged with this investigative 
and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to util-
ize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks. . . . Un-
reviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to ob-
tain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of pri-
vacy and protected speech.”166 Exigent circumstances related to 
feared medical emergencies can be distinguished. Although invasions 
of privacy are always a concern, when dealing with non-law enforce-
ment exigent circumstances, the officers generally lack intent to 
gather evidence or make an arrest, as they are entering for the pur-
poses of providing what they believe will be needed emergency ser-
vices. Thus, it is possible a court will be more lenient in its review of 
such cases because the intent behind the search and the circum-
stances leading to the search do not generally pose the same risks to 
the individual. In Hornblower v. State,167 the Florida Supreme Court 
addressed this aspect of the exception when it stated, “the ‘emer-
gency exception’ permits police to enter and investigate private 
premises to preserve life, property, or render first aid, provided they 
do not enter with an accompanying intent either to arrest or 
search.”168 It is unclear how the presence of a law enforcement objec-
tive along with a feared medical emergency would alter the analysis. 
Ultimately, the justification for a law enforcement-based or non-law 
enforcement-based warrantless entry will probably hinge on whether 
the court views that “the need to act expeditiously is essential.”169 
 If the court’s ruling in Riggs II finds further conflict in lower courts, 
a future possibility is to modify the ruling by adopting an approach 
taken in other jurisdictions. Some federal courts have explicitly la-
beled the feared medical emergency as a variant of the exigent circum-
stances exception, calling it the emergency aid exception.170 And some 
of these courts have set out more detailed parameters for when a war-
rantless search falls within the exception. An example of such a test is 
found in Bloom v. City of Scottsdale,171 an unpublished opinion from 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Bloom, the court set out three 
factors which determine whether the exception is triggered:  
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there 
is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assis-
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tance for the protection of life or property. (2) The search must not 
be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. (3) 
There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable 
cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be 
searched.172 
 The first factor was explicitly addressed by the court in Riggs II, 
the second seems to have been implicitly considered (and was men-
tioned when discussing court precedent), but it is not clear if the 
Florida Supreme Court did (or would) require a finding of near prob-
able cause to associate the emergency with the place to be searched 
in order to justify the warrantless entry. 
 Hypothetically, one may wonder how Riggs II might affect a miss-
ing adult person’s case. For example, assume an individual called the 
police station to report a female friend who had been missing for sev-
eral days from work. This missing person failed to call in but is 
known to call in on the rare occasions she will be out; there was no 
answer at the woman’s door when her friend went to visit, although 
her car is sitting outside; the trash can is sitting by the road, when 
the trash was picked up several days before; and the woman has not 
answered her home or cell phone or returned calls in several days. 
Would a warrantless entry be justified under the exigent circum-
stances exception? It is not clear from the Riggs II opinion. Arguably, 
one can reasonably infer from such facts that the woman may have 
suffered from some kind of emergency and be in need of assistance 
but unable to request it. But there are numerous other explanations 
why the woman might be temporarily unreachable for several days, 
including reasons that have nothing to do with a need for emergency 
assistance. And even if the woman is in need of assistance, it is un-
known whether the inferences link up strongly enough with her 
house, justifying immediate warrantless entry. Additionally, if the 
woman has already been missing for several days, a slightly longer 
delay to obtain a warrant may not make a difference. 
 In United States District Court, the Supreme Court stated that 
one of its primary functions in resolving the case was “to examine 
and balance the basic values at stake in this case: the duty of Gov-
ernment to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger 
posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free 
expression.”173 In Riggs II, the Florida Supreme Court similarly had 
to balance competing interests. There, the competing interests were 
the duty of police officers to provide aid combined with the expecta-
tion of the public to receive aid in emergency situations and the pri-
                                                                                                                     
 172. Id. at *3-4 (citing Arizona v. Fisher, 686 P.2d 750, 760 (Ariz. 1984), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 1066 (1984)). 
 173. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972). 
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vacy interests and property rights of individuals. The ripple effects of 
the court’s opinion remain to be seen, but in the specific circum-
stances of Riggs II, the court decided that “[the] resulting invasion of 
privacy is one that prudent, law-abiding citizens can accept as the 
fair and necessary price of having the police available as a safety net 
in emergencies.”174 Although the opinion in Riggs II was brief, 
straightforward, and unanimous, this Note shows the underlying 
complexity of the issue and the possible complications that may flow 
from its resolution.  
TAXATION—EXEMPTIONS FOR MUNICIPALLY OWNED PROPERTY—
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT STATUTES IMPOSING AD 
VALOREM TAXES ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES OWNED BY A 
MUNICIPALITY ARE NOT FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL—Florida De-
partment of Revenue v. City of Gainesville (Revenue II), 918 So. 2d 
250 (Fla. 2005). 
 Florida Department of Revenue v. City of Gainesville (Revenue II),175 
recently decided by the Florida Supreme Court, involved a challenge 
by the City of Gainesville (“City”) against state statutory provisions 
that mandated municipalities pay ad valorem taxes on property owned 
and used by the municipalities to provide telecommunications ser-
vices.176 The City made a facial challenge to the relevant provisions, 
claiming the obligatory tax was unconstitutional under article VII, 
section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution.177 Article VII, section 3(a) pro-
vides an exemption from taxation for “property owned by a municipal-
ity and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes.”178 In 
this case, the focus of the court’s analysis “hinge[d] on whether provid-
ing two-way telecommunications services to the public always serves 
‘municipal or public purposes.’ ”179 Holding six to one that that ad 
valorem taxation of a municipality’s telecommunications services is 
not facially unconstitutional, the court reversed the First District 
Court and remanded with directions to reverse the summary judgment 
granted to the City by the trial court.180 The court emphasized its de-
termination was narrow, concluding merely that “a municipality does 
not as a matter of law engage in an activity essential to the welfare of 
the community” in providing telecommunication services.181 Given the 
high standard that must be met to find a statute facially unconstitu-
                                                                                                                     
 174. Riggs v. State (Riggs II), 918 So. 2d 274, 282-83 (Fla. 2005). 
 175. 918 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2005). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 255. 
 178. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a). 
 179. Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 256. 
 180. Id. at 266. 
 181. Id. at 253. 
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tional, the majority opinion in one sense is not surprising. However, as 
pointed out by the dissent and lower courts, the majority opinion is 
somewhat disconcerting because it appears to alter the longstanding 
state definition of “municipal purpose” and makes questionable 
whether other municipal services will be able to withstand challenges 
to their tax-exempt status. 
 Local governments in Florida receive their primary source of reve-
nue through ad valorem taxes levied on real property and tangible 
personal property; therefore, critical tax dollars are lost when govern-
ment-owned property is incorrectly classified as exempt.182 In Florida, 
the total value of government-exempt property owned by municipali-
ties totaled approximately $58.5 billion in 2004.183 Ad valorem means 
literally “according to the value,”184 and this type of tax has two parts. 
The first component is the rate at which the tax will be imposed, and 
the second element is the assessed value of the taxable property, gen-
erally determined by a property appraiser.185 Multiplying these two 
values provides the amount of tax that will be imposed.186  
 In 1995, the Florida legislature enacted legislation enabling gov-
ernmental entities to sell two-way telecommunication services to the 
public.187 Two years later, the ability of government entities to exercise 
that right became contingent upon the payment of ad valorem taxes or 
equivalent fees, which was set out in section 2 of chapter 97-197, Laws 
of Florida, and which created section 166.047, Telecommunications 
Services, Florida Statutes (1997).188 In order for a municipality to re-
ceive or hold a certificate from the Public Service Commission to oper-
ate a telecommunications facility and in order for such services to sat-
isfy the public purpose requirement under article VIII, section 2(b) of 
the Florida Constitution (which establishes municipal authority),189 
the municipality is required to pay ad valorem taxes on such a facility. 
In addition, the 1997 legislation amended a prior statute to establish 
that a municipality providing two-way telecommunications services to 
                                                                                                                     
 182. David M. Hudson, Governmental Immunity and Taxation in Florida, 9 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 221, 228 (1998).  
 183. State of Florida Department of Revenue, Assessed Values of Real, Personal, and 
Railroad Property by Municipality for 2004 and 2003, 74, available at http:// 
www.myflorida.com/dor/property/databk.html (follow “2004 Assessment Data by Munici-
pality” hyperlink under “Top Data Book Requests”). 
 184. 71 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 18 (2005). 
 185. Hudson, supra note 182, at 228. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville (Revenue II), 918 So. 2d 250, 253 (Fla. 
2005) (citing FLA. STAT. § 364.02(12) (1995)). 
 188. Id.  
 189. “Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to en-
able them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render mu-
nicipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise 
provided by law. Each municipal legislative body shall be elective.” FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 
2(b). 
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the public does not constitute an exempt use for ad valorem tax pur-
poses as set out in section 196.199(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1995).190 In 
sum, “[t]he purpose and effect of this legislation is to make property 
owned and used by a municipality for a telecommunications business 
subject to ad valorem property taxation.”191  
 Operating under the fictitious name of Gainesville Regional Utili-
ties, the City obtained certificates to operate as a public telecommuni-
cations provider and sold telecommunications infrastructure and inte-
grated telecommunications services to the public.192 Due to the legisla-
tive changes above, the City was subject to ad valorem taxation on 
property providing these services. The City filed suit in 2000, contend-
ing the two portions of the recent law directly conflicted with article 
VII, section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution, which gives municipalities 
certain exemptions from ad valorem taxation and states in pertinent 
part: “All property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it 
for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from taxation.”193 The 
trial court agreed with the City, granting summary judgment and 
finding the sections facially unconstitutional; the First District af-
firmed, with a dissent from Judge Ervin.194 Maintaining its position on 
the appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, the City contended a facial 
violation existed because the relevant provisions made property that 
was used for municipal or public purposes taxable, which is expressly 
prohibited in the Florida Constitution.195 The Department of Revenue 
(“Department”) based its argument on Judge Ervin’s dissent and ar-
gued for “a narrower construction of the ‘municipal or public purposes’ 
that would exclude a municipality’s telecommunications business that 
competes with the private sector for customers.”196 
 The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, recogniz-
ing that in order to find a statute facially unconstitutional, there 
must be “no set of circumstances . . . under which the statute would 
be valid.”197 As mentioned previously, the crux of the court’s analysis 
was on whether the two-way telecommunications services always 
satisfy “municipal or public purposes,” so that the property would 
qualify for the exemption from ad valorem taxation set out in article 
VII, section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution.198 Because “municipal or 
                                                                                                                     
 190. Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 254 (noting that certain exceptions existed but were not 
applicable to this case); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville (Revenue I), 859 So. 2d 
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 191. Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 254. 
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 193. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a) (emphasis added); see also Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 255. 
 194. Id. at 255. 
 195. Answer Brief for Appellee at 7, Revenue II, No. SC03-2273. 
 196. Revenue II, 918 So. 2d. at 256. 
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 198. Id. 
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public purposes” is not defined in article VII, section 3(a), the court 
first had to establish a definition and then proceed to determine 
whether telecommunications services fell within it.199 
 In establishing the definition, the court first looked to how the 
term “municipal purpose” was construed under the Florida Constitu-
tion of 1885, in order to give historical perspective and context to ar-
ticle VII, section 3(a), which was adopted in the 1968 revision to the 
Florida Constitution.200 The 1885 Constitution provided two provi-
sions for tax exemptions for property used for municipal purposes, 
both of which the court found to be non-self-executing.201 The court 
explained that under those provisions it “deferred to the Legisla-
ture’s authorization of municipal functions and clear intention to ex-
empt property used therefore from ad valorem taxation.”202 Addition-
ally, the court held that competition with the private sector did not 
automatically prevent a municipal purpose from being exempt “if the 
Legislature determined that the activity was essential to the welfare 
of the municipality.”203 
 The 1968 revision to the Florida Constitution led to the current 
article VII, section 3(a), which provides the exemption from ad valo-
rem taxation for property used for “municipal or public purposes.”204 
In contrast to the provisions from the 1885 Constitution, the court 
explained article VII, section 3(a) is self-executing and does not re-
quire that the legislature declare an activity meets a municipal pur-
pose to qualify for the tax exemption.205 Furthermore, the 1968 revi-
sion requires that exempt property be used by the municipality that 
owns it, whereas a provision in the 1885 Constitution did not man-
date ownership and use by the municipality as long as other condi-
tions were met.206 After examining the history of the revision and 
relevant case law, the court concluded that separate tests applied 
when dealing with private interests in municipally owned property 
and when dealing with property both owned and used solely by the 
municipality.207 In the latter, which is relevant to the City’s case, the 
question is “whether ‘municipal or public purposes’ under article VII, 
section 3(a) of the 1968 Constitution is as broad as ‘municipal pur-
poses’ under the corresponding provisions of the 1885 Constitution” 
                                                                                                                     
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 257-59. 
 201. Id. at 258. 
 202. Id. at 259. 
 203. Id. (emphasis added). 
 204. Id. The addition of public purposes is irrelevant, as the Florida Supreme Court pre-
viously held that “public purposes” and “municipal purposes” were synonymous. Id. at 261. 
 205. Id. at 259. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 259-61. 
1252  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1227 
 
as interpreted in court precedent.208 Answering this, the court stated 
that the framers of article VII, section 3(a) did not intend to narrow 
the definition of municipal purposes from its previous interpretation; 
they merely wanted to require both ownership and exclusive use of 
property by the municipality.209 This was a legislative response to a 
1965 case holding that municipal property leased to a corporation 
qualified under the old provision.210 
 The Florida Supreme Court next looked to the interpretation of 
“municipal purposes” under article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida 
Constitution, because the City argued that “municipal or public pur-
poses” under the tax exemption provision should receive the same 
construction.211 In examining precedent dealing with article VIII, sec-
tion 2(b), the court explained it had recognized under that provision 
“the broad sweep of municipalities’ inherent power”212 and the ab-
sence of any required authorization from the legislature to exercise 
its authority.213 But the court refused to apply the same construction 
to “municipal or public purposes” under article VII, section 3(a) for 
the purposes of an ad valorem tax exemption. Because the definition 
of “municipal purposes” as interpreted under article VIII, section 2(b) 
had been “imprecise”214 and because that provision and article VII, 
section 3(a) “serve different functions,”215 the court expressly distin-
guished precedent interpreting what constitutes a municipal purpose 
under each.216 In essence, an activity could satisfy the requirement 
for “municipal purposes” under article VIII, section 2(b) but not sat-
isfy the requirement for “municipal or public purposes” under article 
VII, section 3(a), thus leaving it subject to ad valorem taxation. 
 Basing its definition on how “municipal or public purposes” was 
interpreted by the court in prior decisions dealing with the constitu-
tional tax exemption, the court concluded the term “encompass[es] 
activities that are essential to the health, morals, safety, and general 
welfare of the people within the municipality.”217 In applying this 
definition to the challenged provisions, the court could not say that it 
was unconstitutional on its face. Although the stated goals of opening 
telecommunications services to competition were to “provide custom-
ers with freedom of choice, encourage the introduction of new tele-
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communications service, encourage technological innovation, and en-
courage investment in telecommunications infrastructure,”218 the 
court stated that the law enables municipalities to provide such ser-
vices irrespective of whether the service promotes any of the goals.219 
Thus, since it is possible a municipal telecommunications service 
would fail to promote the stated aims of section 365.01(3), Florida 
Statutes, such property would not be exempt from ad valorem taxa-
tion because it would fail to serve a “municipal or public purpose.”220 
Therefore, the court held that the challenged legislation was not un-
constitutional on its face, rendering no opinion on how it would be 
viewed as applied.221 
 Justice Anstead wrote a dissent, in which he disagreed with the 
narrow construction of “municipal purpose.” Although the majority 
stated the definition includes only those activities that are “essential 
to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the people within 
the municipality,”222 Justice Anstead argued that “this definition ap-
pears both arbitrary and without support from our case law, and it 
represents an unprecedented challenge to the broad discretion and au-
thority of local government and home rule traditionally favored in 
Florida.”223 He cited largely to Chief Judge Wolf’s opinion for the First 
District Court of Appeal, which set out the Florida Supreme Court’s 
line of decisions that broadly interpret “municipal purpose.”224 He fur-
ther opined that the majority ruling threatens the very purpose of the 
tax exemption—to encourage municipalities to use property owned by 
them to serve their citizens.225 Anstead also stressed that the 1968 re-
vision to the Florida Constitution was made merely to prevent private 
parties benefiting from the tax exemption, not to alter the exemption 
as applied to the municipality itself.226 Because of this, Justice Anstead 
argued that the court should not have altered the meaning of “munici-
pal purposes” as applied to property owned and used by a municipality 
to serve its citizens from how it was construed prior to the 1968 revi-
sion.227 Additionally, Justice Anstead questioned the ability of other 
public services, such as parks, pools, and zoos, to maintain their tax-
exempt status based on the majority ruling.228 Finally, even using the 
majority’s definition of “municipal or public services,” Justice Anstead 
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argued that telecommunications services meet the requirement that 
the services are essential, providing one more reason for finding the 
legislation unconstitutional.229  
 Two aspects of the majority opinion are somewhat confusing and 
arguably inconsistent. To begin with, as Justice Anstead pointed out 
in his dissent, the majority’s use of precedent for narrowly construing 
“municipal purpose” is contradicted by language in the cases it uses 
to support such an assertion.230 The majority cited State ex rel. 
Harper v. McDavid231 to explain how the court interpreted “municipal 
purposes” regarding tax exemption cases in the past.232 That case in-
volved a challenge to legislatively authorized ad valorem tax exemp-
tion for municipalities establishing and operating low-rent housing 
units.233 There, the court opined: 
What constituted a municipal purpose is a legislative question that 
should not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of a 
clear abuse of discretion. . . . [T]he time was when municipal pur-
pose was restricted to police protection or such enterprises as were 
strictly governmental, but that concept has been very much ex-
panded . . . .234 
Although McDavid used the terminology “essential to the health, 
morals, protection, and welfare of the municipality,” the court cited 
to another case that listed golf courses and office buildings among a 
sample list showing what types of city projects would constitute a 
“municipal purpose.”235  
 Based on the above description and the examples provided, it 
seems there is an inconsistency between the majority’s assertion that 
it would construe “municipal or public purposes” under article VII, 
section 3(a) in accordance with “the definition utilized by the Court 
in its prior decisions on the constitutional tax exemption”236 and that 
it would construe municipal purposes as activities that are “essen-
tial,” encompassing “the concept of great need or necessity.”237 In 
Saunders v. City of Jacksonville,238 the court deferred to a legislative 
decision exempting from ad valorem taxation property owned by a 
municipality’s public utility that provided services in a different 
                                                                                                                     
 229. Id. at 272-73. 
 230. Id. at 266-70. 
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county.239 The court stated specifically that although the act might 
enable the city to compete with private utilities that must pay taxes 
that was not enough to declare it invalid.240 Likewise, in Revenue II, 
the majority stated that governmental-propriety activities are not 
necessarily outside the bounds of what constitutes “municipal or pub-
lic purposes.”241 When a government has a proprietary function, how-
ever, it seems difficult to reconcile the service provided with the no-
tion of “essential” as the majority claims to define it. Although nu-
merous types of services may be needed in a general sense, if a gov-
ernment is competing with private service providers, whether it is 
truly “necessary or indispensable”242 that the municipality provide 
the same service becomes more tenuous. 
 The majority in Revenue II also cited City of Sarasota v. Mikos243 
as another case conveying its interpretation of “municipal or public 
purpose.” There, the court held that “vacant land held by a munici-
pality is presumed to be in use for a public purpose if it is not actu-
ally in use for a private purpose on tax assessment day.”244 Although 
the land was not being used at all, but was merely being held for al-
leged future public uses, the court deferred to the legislative deter-
mination that it was being held for future public needs and, thus, it 
constituted a municipal purpose and was exempt from ad valorem 
taxation.245 Again, as Justice Anstead highlighted, it is difficult to see 
the broad interpretation of “municipal or public purposes” in that 
case as aligning with the alleged “basic, necessary, or indispensable” 
requirement set out by the majority.246 Because precedent suggests a 
more lenient and broad construction of “municipal or public pur-
poses,” it seems the majority did not adhere to its asserted position 
that it would continue to interpret the term in accordance with past 
history; the majority in reality seems to have narrowed the definition 
in Revenue II.  
 The Department relied heavily on Sebring Authority v. McIntyre247 in 
arguing for a narrower construction of “municipal or public purposes.”248 
Based on that case and Williams v. Jones,249 the Department further con-
tended that the “governmental-governmental/governmental-proprietary 
                                                                                                                     
 239. Id. at 650-51. 
 240. Id. at 650. 
 241. See Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 259. 
 242. See id. at 264 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 396 (10th 
ed. 1999)). 
 243. 374 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979). 
 244. Id. at 460. 
 245. See id. at 459-61. 
 246. Revenue II, 918 So. 2d at 270 (Anstead, J., dissenting). 
 247. 783 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2001). 
 248. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 1-3, Revenue II, Case No. SC 03-2273 (Fla. 2005). 
 249. 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975). 
1256  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1227 
 
standard” should be applied to the statutes being challenged here.250 Un-
der that test, “article VII, section 3(a) does not permit municipal property 
leased to private entities for governmental-proprietary activities to be tax 
exempt,”251 proprietary activities being those generally operated for profit. 
However, as the First District pointed out, that case and others put forth 
to support a narrower construction “involve situations where municipal 
property is being leased or utilized by a private entity”252 and not as to 
municipal property owned and used by the municipality itself. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court explicitly noted a clear distinction between the two 
scenarios, concluding that “the ‘governmental-governmental test’ gov-
erns eligibility for the constitutional tax exemption in article VII, section 
3(a)”253 and “was never intended to apply to property both owned and 
used exclusively by a municipality.”254 Although the court said it would 
not apply that test to the statutes regarding telecommunications ser-
vices, the court ultimately agreed with the Department on the resolu-
tion of the issue.  
 The majority pointed out that telecommunications services dif-
fered from other services that precedent categorized as falling under 
the scope of “municipal or public purposes,” such as electrical power 
and public parks, in that telecommunications services were not pro-
vided by the public sector throughout history.255 However, it is not 
entirely clear why that distinction matters given that (a) the court 
said a municipal purpose could be served despite the fact that the ac-
tivity competed with the private sector, and (b) the focus is on the 
whether the service is essential rather than how it has historically 
been provided.256  
 Ultimately, the court stated that because a municipality could en-
ter the market without furthering the goals stated under section 
364.01(3), which laid out the legislature’s reasoning behind allowing 
municipalities to enter the telecommunications market to begin with, 
it was possible a municipality would not provide a service essential to 
the health, morals, safety and general welfare of its citizens.257 Again, 
it is not entirely clear why providing telecommunications services, 
even if it furthers one of the three listed goals of introducing new lev-
els of service, fostering innovation, or encouraging infrastructure in-
vestment, automatically means the service does not serve a “munici-
pal or public purpose.” 
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 The standard that must be met to find a statute facially unconsti-
tutional is very high—the court must find that there is no “set of cir-
cumstances under which the challenged enactment might be up-
held.”258 Therefore, to a certain extent the decision is not entirely 
surprising, irrespective of the ambiguities mentioned above. Whether 
“municipal or public purpose” under article VII, section 3(a) is de-
fined narrowly or broadly, it is not illogical for the court to conclude a 
set of circumstances could exist where a municipality would provide 
telecommunications services under circumstances where those ser-
vices are neither “essential” nor even for the “comfort, convenience, 
safety and happiness of the citizens.”259  
 Yet, Justice Anstead in his dissent argued plausibly that even fol-
lowing the majority’s narrower interpretation of “municipal or public 
purpose” exemption from ad valorem taxation, these provisions still 
satisfy the requirement.260 He noted the relevance of telecommunica-
tions services for the purposes of education, to broadcast warnings of 
emergencies, and to enable citizens to call the police or fire depart-
ment.261 Moreover, the First District pointed out that municipalities, 
to enter the telecommunications market, are issued certificates from 
the Public Service Commission, which in itself suggests the services 
are for the welfare of citizens.262 Furthermore, as the trial court 
noted, the absence of a municipal monopoly in this area is irrelevant 
to the need for the services. Telecommunications, if anything, are 
“more analogous to such services as electricity and water, long recog-
nized as serving valid municipal and public purposes.”263 Thus, Jus-
tice Anstead contested the majority’s definition of “municipal or pub-
lic purposes” and whether telecommunications fits within that defini-
tion if applied. 
 The outcome of this case could potentially increase litigation and 
affect public policy. To begin with, the statutes survived in this case 
under a facial challenge, with no opinion given regarding how an as-
applied challenge would be decided. Any municipality wanting to 
challenge ad valorem taxes placed on its telecommunications services 
will therefore have to challenge it on the latter basis in hopes of pre-
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venting the imposition of the taxes. Furthermore, the Florida legisla-
ture could, in theory, pass similar laws requiring ad valorem taxation 
of other municipal services, such as parks, pools, and zoos, on the ba-
sis that it is possible under “some set of circumstances” that those 
services also fail to serve a “municipal or public purpose.”264 Again, if 
similar legislation to that challenged in Revenue I were passed re-
specting other services, an increase in as-applied challenges to such 
laws could emerge. Moreover, although the court did not consider 
public policy implications, as legitimately that was not the issue pre-
sented to it, the imposition of ad valorem taxes on property owned 
and used by the municipality to provide services to its citizens could 
make utility services more expensive to provide and may not “truly 
‘level the playing field.’ ”265 In such cases, the statutes challenged in 
Revenue II and any similarly passed legislation will serve as a disin-
centive for municipalities to provide services to its citizens.  
 Ultimately, it appears that the construction of “municipal or pub-
lic purpose” with regards to tax exemption cases may be imprecise, 
just as the court claimed the construction of “municipal purpose” is 
under article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution.266 The ma-
jority, however, decided that the definition was not imprecise and 
that it could construe a definition of “municipal or public purposes” 
for the purposes of ad valorem tax exemption in article VII, section 
3(a). Based on precedent, the majority concluded the phrase requires 
that the government activity is “essential.” It then found that tele-
communications services do not necessarily constitute essential ser-
vices and rejected the facial challenge to the statutes at issue. As the 
First District and the dissent noted, however, whether “municipal or 
public purpose” requires that the government activity is essential is 
debatable, and whether telecommunications services are essential if 
such a definition is imposed is also debatable. The case leaves uncer-
tain what government services will continue to constitute a “munici-
pal or public purpose” in order to be exempt from ad valorem taxa-
tion and may affect municipal decisions dealing with the provision of 
public services.  
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS STATE 
AGENCIES ARE BOUND BY CONTROLLING JUDICIAL STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATIONS—Costarell v. Florida Unemployment Appeals 
Commission, 916 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 2005). 
 As a fundamental tenant of American jurisprudence, once a point 
of law has been resolved by judicial decision, it is then binding upon 
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courts of lesser jurisdiction.267 Within Florida, a decision from any 
district court of appeal is binding upon all Florida trial courts so long 
as interdistrict conflict does not exist.268 In Costarell v. Florida Un-
employment Appeals Commission, the Florida Supreme Court made 
clear that this framework extends into the field of administrative 
practice, where state agencies are bound by statutory interpretations 
by courts of the state.269 
 In Costarell, the issue before the court was whether the failure of 
a claimant to file weekly claims once the claimant had been deter-
mined ineligible for benefits by the Florida Unemployment Appeals 
Commission (“Commission”) precluded the claimant from receiving 
benefits even upon successful appeal.270 The Third District Court of 
Appeal (“Third District”) faced this same question on three previous 
occasions and the court consistently ruled a claimant could not be 
denied benefits upon successful appeal of an ineligibility ruling,271 be-
cause, as the Florida Supreme Court pointed out, a claimant “would 
ordinarily and reasonably believe it would be a useless act to con-
tinue to file weekly claims.”272  
 The issue first came before the Third District in Savage v. Macy’s 
East, Inc. (Savage I),273 where the court determined that the Com-
mission had wrongfully held the claimant, Savage, did not qualify for 
compensation.274 Following this decision, the Commission continued 
to deny the claimant benefits based upon her failure to file weekly 
claims following her ineligibility determination by the Commission 
and during the subsequent appeal.275 The Third District then issued 
another opinion in Savage v. Macy’s East, Inc. (Savage II),276 in re-
sponse to Savage’s motion to enforce the Savage I court’s mandate in 
which the court rejected the Commission’s claims regarding the 
weekly filings and explained that the Commission “had no authority 
to deviate” from the court’s prior ruling “directing that the claimant 
receive benefits now that she had been determined to be properly eli-
gible.”277 Again this issue came before the Third District in Dines v. 
Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission,278 where the court held, 
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as previously “said in dictum” in Savage II, “that the denial of bene-
fits on this ground is entirely erroneous.”279 
 Despite the Third District’s Savage II and Dines rulings remain-
ing the prevailing law, Mr. Costarell, like the claimants in both pre-
vious cases, had successfully appealed his declaration of ineligibility 
only to be subsequently denied benefits by the Commission due to his 
failure to file weekly claims after his denial and during the pendency 
of his appeal.280 Mr. Costarell then filed a pro se appeal, and the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal (“Second District”) affirmed the Com-
mission’s action.281 The case then came before the Florida Supreme 
Court based upon certified conflict between the Second District’s rul-
ing and the Third District’s holding in Dines.282 
 The question before the Supreme Court of Florida in Costarell was 
whether weekly filings must be continued upon denial of benefits in 
order to qualify for unemployment compensation once the claimant 
was ultimately deemed eligible.283 The majority concluded that while 
the plain language of the statute does require claimants file claims 
weekly, the absence of a mandate to do so once a claimant has been 
determined ineligible relieves the claimant of the continuing obliga-
tion.284 The court pragmatically reasoned that “without an express 
statutory directive to do so,” an ineligible claimant would see no rea-
son to continue filing claims following an adverse eligibility ruling.285 
 The dissenting opinion in Costarell instead relied upon the plain 
language of the two relevant statutory provisions.286 According to the 
text of one of these statutes at the time, unemployed individuals 
were eligible for compensation only if a claim had been made with re-
spect to the week.287 Furthermore, the second provision provided that 
payment was contingent upon the claimant reporting at least bi-
weekly.288 The dissent reasoned that in the absence of any estoppel 
argument legally excusing Mr. Costarell’s noncompliance, he “failed 
to meet these express, unambiguous statutory conditions for the re-
ceipt of UC benefits” for the weeks in question.289 
 Ultimately, the issue of weekly filings was decided by the legisla-
ture subsequent to the events that gave rise to this suit.290 In a 2003 
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amendment, the legislature expressly provided that claimants are 
required to continue filings while their appeals are pending.291   
 Although the differing views of the majority and dissent offer an 
interesting look into the divergent judicial philosophies that cur-
rently make up the court, the most interesting aspect of this decision 
came in the majority’s stinging rebuke of the Commission’s action in 
this case, which the court presented as the Commission’s systemic 
denial of justice to “claimants who are typically unrepresented by 
counsel and are both unaware of and are not told of their rights un-
der the law.”292 
 In its opinion quashing the Second District’s previous ruling in 
Costarell and affirming Dines, the Florida Supreme Court reissued a 
stern admonishment from the Third District in response to the Com-
mission “ignor[ing] . . . the established law,” going so far as to sug-
gest the matter may justify further action on the part of the legisla-
ture, state executive branch, or Secretary of Labor.293 The Florida 
Supreme Court further pointed out that the Commission made no at-
tempt to explain its failure to follow the established law, offering 
only the same arguments put forth in previous cases, which this 
court rejected as well.294 Finally, the court cautioned the Commission 
“that it too is bound by the rule of law” and “express[ed] dismay” that 
it “would show so little regard for the controlling holdings of an ap-
pellate court of the State of Florida.”295 So that such objectionable 
conduct might not occur in the future, the court made perfectly clear 
the Commission’s duty of deference: 
   An agency of this state, such as the Commission, must follow the 
interpretations of statutes as interpreted by the courts of the state. 
Like trial courts, if there is a controlling interpretation by a dis-
trict court of appeal in this state, the Commission must follow it, 
even if the court of appeal is located outside the district of the trial 
court. If there is a conflict between interpretations by different 
courts of appeal, that may provide a basis to reach the supreme 
court for a final interpretation. Thereafter, the supreme court’s in-
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terpretation of the statute must prevail, barring future legislative 
changes to the statute.296 
Though both the majority and dissent offer an interesting discussion 
of the statutory scheme relied upon by the Commission regarding 
weekly filings,297 the implications of this case are mostly limited to its 
administrative procedure aspects as the legislature has now settled 
the issue of the necessity of weekly filings. 
PROCEDURAL LAW—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT CREATES A BRIGHT-LINE 
RULE THAT COURT ORDERS ENTERED TO RESOLVE GOOD FAITH 
MOTIONS SHOULD AUTOMATICALLY BE TREATED AS ACTIVITY, THUS 
PRECLUDING DISMISSAL—Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2005). 
 The danger of inconsistency arises when courts interpret rules of 
procedure and statutes. Even when a court interprets a rule or stat-
ute so as to make it seem clear, another court may come along and 
misinterpret the previous court’s decision. Whenever the plain mean-
ing of a statute is unambiguous, it should be adhered to in order to 
avoid inconsistency. The fewer subjective decisions a court has to 
make, the less chance there is for prejudice. Wilson v. Salamon298 re-
solved a procedural issue, and the decision will greatly impact law-
suits because it will allow many more lawsuits to remain on the 
docket that would have previously been dismissed.  
 The issue was whether court orders filed to resolve good faith mo-
tions are automatically treated as activity or whether a trial court 
must continue to review its own orders to determine if they are pas-
sive.299 The Florida Supreme Court held that court orders filed to re-
solve good faith motions should automatically be treated as activity, 
and the cases in which these orders are filed should not be dis-
missed.300 The court adopted this bright-line rule and abandoned past 
precedent where an inquiry was made into whether the activity was 
active and “calculated to hasten the suit to judgment,”301 or whether 
it was passive and should be dismissed. 
 The facts of this case are that Ms. Wilson filed a negligence claim 
on March 15, 2001, against Dr. Eva J. Salamon and Bond Clinic, 
P.A., alleging that her daughter was injured at birth.302 The defen-
dants filed an answer, and on June 25, 2001, Kenneth Levine, an at-
torney from Massachusetts, filed a motion to appear pro hac vice as 
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co-counsel for Ms. Wilson; however, an order was never entered on 
this motion.303 On October 29, 2001, the defendants objected to cer-
tain interrogatories and filed responses to requests for production.304 
Then there was no activity in the case until Vivian Sparacio, the 
partner of Mr. Levine filed a similar motion to appear pro hac vice as 
co-counsel for Ms. Wilson, which was granted by an order filed on 
April 4, 2002.305 After this there was no activity until the defendants 
moved to dismiss the action on November 4, 2002.306 
 The Second District Court of Appeal (“Second District”) affirmed 
the trial court’s decision to dismiss the action holding that a motion 
to appear pro hac vice was not “activity” that would preclude dis-
missal under rule 1.420(e), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.307 The 
Second District also certified the question to the Florida Supreme 
Court as one of great public importance.308 In overturning the Second 
District, the Florida Supreme Court held that all good faith trial 
court orders filed to resolve motions should preclude dismissal, and 
no inquiry should be made into whether the activity was active or 
passive.309 In reaching its decision, the majority looked at the history 
of rule 1.420(e) and determined to adhere to its plain meaning.310 
Rule 1.420(e) was adopted in 1966 by the Florida Supreme Court: 
All actions in which it does not affirmatively appear from some ac-
tion taken by filing of pleadings, order of court or otherwise that 
the same is being prosecuted for a period of one year shall be . . . 
dismissed by the court on its own motion or on motion of any in-
terested person . . . after notice to the parties; provided that ac-
tions so dismissed may be reinstated on motion for good cause, 
such motion to be served by any party within one month after such 
order of dismissal.311 
This rule replaced a similar Florida statute.312 In 1976, the court 
positively rephrased the rule and removed the term “affirmatively,” 
replacing it with a condition that activity must appear “on the face of 
the record” to preclude dismissal.313 The court said that it did this be-
cause judges were befuddled by what “affirmatively” meant and were 
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making arbitrary judgments conflicting with the purpose of the 
rule.314 The rule, as interpreted by the court reads: 
In all actions in which it appears on the face of the record that no 
activity by filing of pleadings, order of court, or otherwise has oc-
curred for a period of 10 months . . . shall be dismissed by the court 
on its own motion or on the motion of any interested person . . . af-
ter reasonable notice to the parties, unless a party shows good 
cause in writing at least 5 days before the hearing on the motion 
why the action should remain pending. Mere inaction for a period 
of less than 1 year shall not be sufficient cause for dismissal for 
failure to prosecute.315 
 The majority indicated that the court’s 1951 opinion, in which the 
old statute was interpreted, is to blame for the confusion.316 In Gulf 
Appliance Distributors, Inc. v. Long, the court held that an order al-
lowing for the withdrawal and substitution of counsel was not suffi-
cient activity to preclude dismissal under section 45.19(1), Florida 
Statutes.317 The Gulf Appliance court attempted to define “affirma-
tively” when it stated that the requirement meant “some active 
measure taken by [the] plaintiff, intended and calculated to hasten 
the suit to judgment.”318 The court in Wilson held that Gulf Appliance 
should no longer be the standard because that case was decided 
based on the old rule and the court has since taken out the term “af-
firmatively” from the rule.319 The court reasoned that it is a simple 
question of interpreting the plain meaning of rule 1.420(e), but lower 
courts have continued to be influenced by Gulf Appliance.320 The ma-
jority urged that where courts have not been adhering to the purpose 
of the statute, stare decisis need not be followed.321 The court indi-
cated that the meaning of current rule 1.420(e) was properly con-
strued in Metropolitan Dade County v. Hall, where Justice Wells 
noted that the rule only requires a simple review of the record to de-
termine whether “[t]here is either activity on the face of the record or 
there is not.”322  
 The majority justified its decision by balancing competing policy 
issues. The court’s first and foremost concern, as provided in the 
                                                                                                                     
 314. Wilson, 923 So. 2d at 365. 
 315. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.420(e). 
 316. Wilson, 923 So. 2d at 365. 
 317. Gulf Appliance Distribs., Inc. v. Long, 53 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. 1951).   
 318. Id. at 707 (citing Argusta Sugar Co. v. Haley, 112 So. 731, 732 (La. 1927)).  
 319. Wilson, 923 So. 2d at 365. 
 320. Id. at 366 (citing Moossun v. Orlando Reg’l Health Care, 826 So. 2d 945, 946 (Fla. 
2002)). 
 321. Id. at 367 (“Although stare decisis is fundamentally important in our system of 
justice, it is not ‘an ironclad and unwavering rule’ so that we must bend to the ‘voice of the 
past, however outmoded or meaningless that voice may have become.’ ”) (citing Weiand v. 
State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1055 n.12 (Fla. 1999)). 
 322. 784 So. 2d 1087, 1090 (Fla. 2001).  
2006]                          RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1265 
 
Florida Constitution, is to “be open to every person for redress of any 
injury”323 and to resolve cases on the merits.324 The second, and lesser 
concern, which is addressed by rule 1.420(e), is that cases filed and 
left inactive will be weeded out so as not to hinder the first objec-
tive.325 The majority felt it had created a clear, bright-line test for 
courts by allowing judges to simply dismiss “cases in which no record 
activity took place within a year” rather than having to guess 
whether an order is passive or active.326 The majority also stated that 
it balanced the two policy issues by allowing a good faith showing as 
to why the case should not be dismissed for inactivity.327 The majority 
held that the order in Wilson, which granted the second motion to 
appear pro hac vice, appeared on the face of the record, and so dis-
missal of the case per rule 1.420(e) was not proper.328  
 Justice Pariente concurred and concluded that “increased atten-
tion to judicial case management and less emphasis on arbitrary ap-
plication of rule 1.420(e) better serves the administration of justice 
and the goal of deciding cases on the merits.”329 Justice Pariente 
noted that rule 1.420(e) is not as critical a tool for managing the 
docket as it used to be because of several other rules of court that 
have recently put more emphasis on judicial case management.330 
Justice Pariente expressed confidence that judges have adequate 
tools to manage their cases and argued that the majority’s construc-
tion of rule 1.420(e) will allow judges to focus on what Justice Pari-
ente believes is most important issue—that is, “what the parties are 
doing to bring the case to resolution.”331  
 Justice Bell concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed 
with the majority that a bright-line test is appropriate for pleadings or 
orders of the court, but he indicated that trial judges should still have 
discretion for the “or otherwise” language in the rule.332 Justice Bell 
agreed with Justice Wells in the dissent that abiding by the rule for 
anything besides a pleading or order of the court “will have bad and 
unfair consequences for many who are subjected to lawsuits that are 
not fairly and with due diligence progressed to final judgment.”333 Jus-
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tice Bell indicated that rule 1.420(e) should be interpreted on a case-
by-case basis and that any error made by the judge can be remedied.334 
 Justice Wells dissented based on his belief that the majority’s 
bright-line rule will have “bad and unfair consequences” for people 
dragged into lawsuits that are not pursued in a timely manner.335 Jus-
tice Wells stated that the ad hoc motion in this case should not have 
been considered “activity” because it did nothing to advance the case 
towards a resolution.336 Justice Wells argued that the two-step test 
laid out in Del Duca v. Anthony337 was interpreted correctly by the 
Second District in Metropolitan Dade County v. Hall.338 The test from 
Del Duca is (1) whether there has been recorded activity for the year 
preceding the motion; and (2) if there has been no record, the plaintiff 
can establish good cause why the action should not be dismissed.339 
The Second District interpreted Metropolitan Dade County v. Hall as 
holding that the first step only requires the court to look at whether 
there was activity, not to analyze whether that activity was passive or 
active.340 Justice Wells cited this interpretation of Hall as incorrect 
and found the interpretation of Hall in Sheen v. Time Inc. Magazine 
Co.341 correct.342 In Sheen, the court concluded that the first part of the 
test in Del Duca, if there is some sort of activity, involves deciding 
whether the activity “constitutes sufficient record activity to preclude 
dismissal under rule 1.420(e).”343 The court in Sheen held that Hall 
only dealt with the second step of the Del Duca test—the good cause 
analysis—and that the court “has not receded from Del Duca, which 
teaches that discovery activity filed of record does not always qualify 
as sufficient record activity for purposes of rule 1.420(e).”344  
 Justice Wells contended that the majority’s bright-line test will 
lead to results for defendants that are “akin to slow-drip water tor-
ture.”345 He reasoned that if any activity qualifies as activity that 
precludes dismissal under 1.420(e), the defendant will be unduly 
burdened with a stagnant lawsuit that can put his life on hold for a 
long time.346 Justice Wells rejected the argument that the defendant 
can take on the task of moving the case for trial because it would im-
pose on the defendant the burden of paying “substantial and over-
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whelming expenses . . . to end a process that [he] did not initiate”; 
and it is, fundamentally, the plaintiff’s responsibility to bring the 
claim forward.347 Justice Wells stated that if a defendant moves for 
trial, he will be prejudiced by the jury in a case that the plaintiff has 
not pursued.348 Also, Justice Wells expressed his belief that the new 
bright-line rule will allow plaintiffs to abuse the system and extend 
cases indefinitely, which will prejudice the defense because of wit-
nesses whose memories fade or who move away.349 Justice Wells 
would have relied on the court’s prior precedent that “required . . . 
the party bringing a claim to take some type of activity . . . which can 
be considered as designed in good faith to prosecute the case . . . to an 
ultimate conclusion.”350 Justice Wells admitted that there are some 
problems with the precedent of the court and suggested that amend-
ing the current rule was the best way to solve these problems.351 He 
suggested adopting a rule that would provide a bright-line test but 
with a shorter time limit that would encourage parties who bring 
claims to be efficient.352  
 The issue of how to interpret rule 1.420(e) has plagued Florida 
courts for years, and the bright-line test created by the majority will 
help to alleviate this uncertainty and put the focus of these cases 
back on the merits. In Moossun v. Orlando Regional Health Care,353 
the Florida Supreme Court tried to answer the question of what con-
stituted activity that would preclude dismissal under rule 1.420(e).354 
In that case, the court arbitrarily held that a case management con-
ference ordered by the judge did not constitute record activity, and 
the case was dismissed.355 In reaching its decision, the court disap-
proved of two lower court cases that had held that case management 
conferences were record activity.356 In the dissent, Justice Lewis 
made a good point that courts have held lesser “record activity” as 
sufficient to preclude dismissal, such as a defendant’s amended an-
swer and a letter sent to a judge and placed in the file.357 Having 
judges determine whether activity is sufficient to move litigation to-
ward resolution is a practice of “arbitrary efficiency,” which will 
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cause many cases that should be decided on their merits to be thrown 
out prematurely at the whim of a judge.358  
 The argument that it is not fair to the defendant to keep cases on 
the docket when the plaintiff is not actively pursuing the case is a 
valid concern, but unless the court can come up with a foolproof test 
to decide what activity is sufficient to preclude dismissal, the plain-
tiff will be just as prejudiced, if not more so, by a non-merit based 
dismissal of his or her case. Also, the old interpretation of rule 
1.420(e) puts attorneys and their clients at a disadvantage because 
attorneys have no reasonably certain way of knowing what actions 
are sufficient to preclude dismissal.359 Attorneys should not have to 
play a guessing game as to what activity will be considered “record 
activity.” Further, the Florida Supreme Court should not have to 
grant certiorari to every case involving rule 1.420(e) to decide how 
the rule should be interpreted, and the new bright-line test prevents 
this scenario. The old interpretation, without more concrete guidance 
from the court about how to determine record activity, is too ambigu-
ous and affords judges too much leeway as arbitrary gatekeepers. 
The bright-line test that the majority puts forth is more manageable, 
and it will help courts objectively apply rule 1.420(e).  
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